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CALIFORNIA PROPOSITIONS 62 & 66 AS MISGUIDED 
MODELS FOR THE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT DEBATE: THE 
ARGUMENT FOR THE INCLUSION OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL 
TEACHING AND OTHER RELIGIOUS DENOMINATIONS IN 
THE DISCUSSION AND A PROPOSED SOLUTION 
 
Cornelius V. Loughery† 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Embedded in the United States’ core at the time of the founding was a deep rev-
erence for the gifts bestowed on humanity by its Creator—“that all men are created 
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that 
among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness.”1 This notion of a hu-
man’s right to life, however, has become obfuscated over the years through the ap-
parent unsettled development of capital punishment statutes, and court decisions, and 
value judgments of “arbitrariness” or “capriciousness” with respect to capital punish-
ment death penalty schemes. With that said, public sentiment on the death penalty 
has shifted considerably in recent years, as indicated by a number of factors—most 
importantly among those is California’s recent ballot initiative to abolish the death 
penalty.2 A close analysis of the discussion leading up to California’s November 8, 
2016, ballot Proposition—discussed in Part I of this Note—indicates that much of 
the sentiment reversal within the state can be attributed to the recent spate of exoner-
ations of death row criminals in the United States, the fallacy of the penological jus-
tifications for capital punishment and, perhaps most importantly to some commenta-
tors, due to the exorbitant costs of execution resulting, in part, from the prolonged 
appeals process. This Note seeks to demonstrate, however, that while these afore-
mentioned rationales for repeal of the death penalty are of paramount importance and 
worthy of critical consideration, they do not effectively redress the totality of the 
underlying issues in the matter of capital punishment. More specifically, the discus-
sion fails to recognize the effects of omitting any real consideration of the views of 
the Catholic faith and other religious denominations from the discussion surrounding 
continuation of capital sentencing; that is, the continued deleterious impact on capital 
 
† Notre Dame Law School, J.D./MBA Candidate, May 2018. I would like to thank Professor Richard Garnett 
for his insight and guidance in the development of this Note. Additionally, I would like to thank my parents 
for teaching me the importance of maintaining a steadfast devotion to my Catholic faith. 
1 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added). 
2 Mike Farrell, Request for Title and Summary for The Justice That Works Act of 2016, STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (Sept. 15, 2015), https://www.oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs/15-
0066%20%28Death%20Penalty%29.pdf?. 
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legal proceedings caused by the voluntary or involuntary removal of actors who hold 
these views. As a result, this Note seeks to illustrate why it is imperative that Cathol-
icism and other faiths be incorporated into and inform the discussion concerning the 
death penalty and its future as an acceptable component of the United States legal 
system. 
Part I of this Note traces the development of the death penalty and repeal attempts 
in California and the underlying rationale, as found in the official proposition state-
ments and the media’s perception conveyed to—and influencing to some extent—the 
voting public. Part II of this Note outlines the tenets of the Catholic faith and other 
religious denominations—though the focus is on Catholic Social Teaching—as foun-
dational information for why the problems discussed in Part III of this Note may arise 
in capital cases. Part III of this Note demonstrates that, while the concerns prompting 
the repeal (Proposition 62)3 or expediting the process (Proposition 66)4 in California 
were certainly valid, neither ballot initiative adequately incorporated a discussion of 
three of the core underlying problems with the death penalty in the state as it is cur-
rently administered. Namely, the creation of death panels through death qualified jury 
selection based on faith-based for cause removal and peremptory challenges during 
voir dire, recusal of judges due to conflicts with their religious beliefs, and the re-
quests of religious based anti-death penalty prosecutors that they not be assigned 
cases in which the sentence of death is a possibility. Finally, Part IV of this Note 
discusses why the California approach in its recently passed Proposition 66 is short-
sighted, why the possibility for a continuation of the problems discussed in Part III 
necessitates the inclusion of the beliefs of the Catholic faith and other religious de-
nominations in discussions of the death penalty, and possible solutions working to-
ward abolishment going forward. While the United States prides itself on the separa-
tion of church and state—and this Note is not advocating a rejection of this notion or 
an overhaul of the relationship—the idea of religious views weighing on public pol-
icy does not infringe on this principle. Rather, as Kevin Doyle, a New York Capital 
Defender, aptly stated in a panel discussion on the death penalty, “there is a funda-
mental misunderstanding about the separation of church and state. It’s not a separa-
tion of religious morality and policy.”5 With Doyle’s thoughts in mind, the general 
trend in societal views on capital punishment, and some of the varying reasons un-
derlying these views,6 indicate the need for the United States to consider a return to 
its moral foundations in discussing the death penalty—foundations built on core val-
ues influenced, at least to some extent, by religious beliefs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 See infra Part I, subsection B. 
4 See infra Part I, subsection C. 
5 Kevin M. Doyle & Charles J. Hynes, Catholics and the Death Penalty Panel Discussion, 44 J. CATH. LEGAL 
STUD. 297, 338 (2005). 
6 See infra Part I, subsection B-C. 
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I. THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN CALIFORNIA. RECENT 
PENDING PROPOSITIONS, AND MEDIA PERCEPTION 
A. A Brief History of the California Death Penalty 
To fully understand capital punishment in California, it is necessary to under-
stand its history. The implementation and administration process of the death penalty 
in California is best characterized as one of marked turbulence.7 From 1893 to 1937, 
state-conducted executions were carried out by hanging, only to be changed to exe-
cution by lethal gas from the years of 1938 through 1967.8 However, in 1967, the 
state underwent an uninterrupted period of twenty-five years in which no executions 
took place due to court decisions—both state and United States Supreme Court deci-
sions.9 Most notably, the California Supreme Court “found that the death penalty 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the California state constitution” in 
1972.10 However, this period of reprieve did not last long, as the death penalty was 
reinstated by the legislature in 1977. The 1977 legislation was later reaffirmed by 
voters in 1978 through Proposition 7—the current status of the law today.11 This early 
instability evident in California’s death penalty legislation has not ceased in the 
twenty-first century due to questions concerning the method of execution.12 In the 
2006 case of Morales v. Tilton, “condemned inmate Michael Angelo Morales’ exe-
cution was stayed because of his claim that California’s administration of its lethal 
injection protocol…would subject him to an unnecessary risk of excess pain and vi-
olate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.”13 After 
the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) attempted to 
mend the lethal injection methodology, a court again “issued an injunction prohibit-
ing CDCR from executing anyone until such time as new lethal injection regulations 
were promulgated” in the case of Mitchell Simms v. CDCR.14 
The foregoing was the backdrop for the recent attempt, prior to Proposition 62, 
to abolish the death penalty and implement a change to the penal system in which life 
without parole was the maximum sentence through Proposition 34 in 2012.15 A re-
 
7 See Cal. Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., The History of Capital Punishment in California, 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Capital_Punishment/history_of_capital_punishment.html.  
8 Id. 
9 Id. (noting that in 1972 “the California Supreme Court found [] the death penalty constituted cruel and unu-
sual punishment under the California state constitution and 107 condemned inmates were resentenced to life 
with the possibility of parole. In 1973, the United States Supreme Court held that the death penalty was un-
constitutional as it was being administered at that time in a number of states. In November 1972, the Califor-
nia electorate amended the state constitution and in 1973, legislation was enacted making the death penalty 
mandatory in specified criminal case … In 1976, the California Supreme Court, basing its decision on a 
United States Supreme Court ruling earlier that year, held that the California death penalty statute was uncon-
stitutional under the U.S. Constitution because it did not allow mitigating circumstances to be admitted as evi-
dence.”). 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 See id. 
13 See Cal. Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., supra note 7. 
14  See Cal. Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., supra note 7. 
15 Sec’y of the State of Cal., California General Election Official Voter Information Guide (2016), 
http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2016/general/en/pdf/complete-vig.pdf. 
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view of the rationale for Proposition 34—asserted by former LA County District At-
torney Gil Garcetti and former Warden of California’s Death Row prison Jeanne 
Woodford—provided in the California General Election Official Voter Information 
Guide for the November 6, 2012, General Election (hereinafter, “2012 Information 
Guide”) reveals similar reasoning to that found in Proposition 62. The key factors 
influencing the Proposition 34 proposal include, among others: the grave risk of ex-
ecuting innocents, the system was broken (only thirteen inmates sentenced to death 
had been executed since 1967, and no one had been executed for the last six years), 
and abolition would have saved taxpayers millions.16 Noticeably absent from the 
2012 Information Guide rationale for abolition is any rejection of capital punishment 
based on moral repugnance or criticism of some of the underlying factors that directly 
contribute to conviction of innocent citizens sentenced to death.17 Though defeated 
by a 52% opposition vote,18 the status of the death penalty remained far from situated 
on stable ground, as Proposition 62 was placed on the ballot shortly thereafter.19 
B. California’s Proposition 62 
Though four years had passed since Proposition 34, much of the same rationale 
for its original support remained consistent with the reasoning for Proposition 62, 
which sought to repeal the death penalty and make life without parole the maximum 
sentence available.20 The ballot initiative submission to the Attorney General focused 
on the exorbitant costs for an ineffective system, the grave possibility of executing 
innocent inmates, and “fairness and uniformity in sentencing through retroactive ap-
plication of this act to replace the death penalty with life in prison without the possi-
bility of parole.”21 More specifically, much of the support for Proposition 62 found 
in the November 8, 2016, California General Election Official Voter Information 
Guide (hereinafter, “2016 Information Guide”) is grounded in the fact that the death 
penalty penal process, as it has been administered over the years, has cost taxpayers 
“$5 billion since 1978 to carry out thirteen executions—a cost of $384 million per 
execution,” and repeal would save taxpayers $150 million per year. Additionally, the 
2016 Information Guide noted that repeal would put an end to a system that has not 
been fixed for almost forty years and has not met the stated penological justifications 
for which it was created, and highlights the one hundred and fifty death row inmates 
that were later found to be innocent.22  
Of particular salience to the discussion in this section is the viewpoint of Arch-
bishop Gomez, though it was not included in the 2016 Information Guide.23 In his 
support for Proposition 62 and advocacy for mercy as “the only credible witness to 
the sanctity of life and the dignity of the human person,” Archbishop Gomez stated 
 
16 Id. at 38. 
17 See id. 
18 Proposition 34, U.C. BERKLEY INST. OF GOVERNMENTAL STUD., https://igs.berkeley.edu/library/elec-
tions/proposition-34. 
19 See Sec’y of the State of Cal., supra note 15. 
20 See Sec’y of the State of Cal., supra note 15, at 82. 
21 Mike Farrell, Request for Title and Summary for The Justice That Works Act of 2016, (Sept. 15, 2015), 
https://www.oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs/15-0066%20%28Death%20Penalty%29.pdf?. 
22 See Sec’y of the State of Cal., supra note 15, at 82. 
23 See Sec’y of the State of Cal., supra note 15, at 82. 
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that “[t]he Catholic Church has always taught that legitimate governments have the 
right to impose the death penalty…[b]ut in recent years, there has been a growing 
consensus that the use of the death penalty can no longer be accepted.”24 Further, he 
went on to cite a “‘strange appetite for violence’ in American culture, violent video 
games, demeaning music and entertainment, [asserting that] ‘[i]n this cultural con-
text, I do not see how the death penalty can ever again express society’s ultimate 
value for human life. In this cultural context, the death penalty can only function as 
one more killing.’”25 However, this focus on the morality of the death penalty and 
incorporation of religious viewpoints on the subject is, again, noticeably absent from 
the rationale in the official Proposition 62 argument for repeal.26 These religious 
viewpoints appear to have garnered much less coverage and attention by the media 
and commentators on the Proposition—as shown in subsection D, Part I of this 
Note—who seem to be more singularly focused on what might best be described as 
the economic pragmatism underlying the Proposition.27 As a result of the omission 
of religious considerations in the discussion, a handful of the underlying factors—
discussed in Part III of this Note—that potentially contribute to the unfairness and 
lack of uniformity in sentencing that the ballot initiative submission sought to redress, 
remain unaddressed.28 
C. Proposition 66 
 A counter initiative to Proposition 62 in the November 8, 2016, election was 
Proposition 66,29 which eventually passed by a small margin.30 The impetus for Prop-
osition 66 in the ballot initiative submission to the Attorney General was fixing the 
inefficient, broken system, rather than repealing the state capital punishment statute, 
and expediting the slow litigation process for inmates sentenced to death in order to 
bring justice to the victims and families, dramatically reduce the costs, and “ensure 
fairness for both defendants and victims,” among other benefits.31 The 2016 Infor-
mation Guide stated similar objectives for the ballot initiative, explicitly spelling out 
the measures to be implemented to achieve the stated goals of the Proposition as fol-
lows:  
 
1. All state appeals should be limited to 5 years.  2. Every murderer 
sentenced to death will have their special appeals lawyer assigned im-
mediately. Currently, it can be five years or more before they are even 
assigned a lawyer.  3. The pool of available lawyers to handle these ap-
peals will be expanded. 4. The trial courts who handled the death penalty 
 
24 Archbishop Jose H. Gomez, Archbishop Gomez: It’s Time to End the Death Penalty, CATHOLIC NEWS 
AGENCY (Sept. 24, 2016), http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/archbishop-gomez-its-time-to-end-the-
death-penalty-19521/. 
25 Id.   
26 See Sec’y of the State of Cal., supra note 15. 
27 See infra Part I, subsection D. 
28 See infra Part III. 
29 Kermit Alexander, Request for Preparation of Circulating Title and Summary for Proposed Initiative (Oct. 
16, 2015), https://www.oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs/15-0096%20%28Death%20Pen-
alty%29_0.pdf? 
30 2016 California Ballot Measures Election Results, POLITICO (Dec. 13, 2016),http://www.polit-
ico.com/2016-election/results/map/ballot-measures/california/. 
31 Alexander, supra note 29. 
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trials and know them best will deal with the initial appeals. 5. The State 
Supreme Court will be empowered to oversee the system and ensure 
appeals are expedited while protecting the rights of the accused.  6. The 
State Corrections Department (Prisons) will reform death row housing; 
taking away special privileges from these brutal killers and saving mil-
lions. Together, these reforms will save California taxpayers over 
$30,000,000 annually, according to former California Finance Director 
Mike Genest, while making our death penalty system work again.32  
 
The problem with this initiative, as the San Francisco Chronicle pointed out, is 
that, among other issues, “it brushes aside the legal and practical realities in the way 
of achieving any time savings.”33 Noting the increase in the number of attorneys re-
quired, the Chronicle pointed out that “attorneys less steeped in the fine points of 
capital appeals—and it is a specialized part of the law—will be representing inmates 
with their lives on the line.”34  In other words, rather than addressing the problems 
and potential for injustice in the system as it is currently administered, it arguably 
amplifies them. These changes made in Proposition 66 are particularly problematic, 
given the issues raised in Part III of this Note. 
D. Media Perception and Opinion 
 The views and rationale reinforced to the public by some of California’s 
largest news publications were often aligned with those discussed in the 2016 Infor-
mation Guide, though with a couple outliers in terms of the scope and direction of 
the position. For example, the Sacramento Bee’s Editorial Board encouraged readers 
to vote for Proposition 62, describing the current California death penalty scheme as 
“dysfunctional” and “beyond repair.”35 Specifically, the paper cited the flaws in the 
system, the current “de facto moratorium” in the state, the economic shortcomings of 
the current system and those that might be exacerbated by Proposition 66, the poten-
tial questions of equal treatment in sentencing, and the disproportionate representa-
tion of specific California counties in terms of inmates sent to death row.36 The San 
Francisco Examiner Editorial Board took a slightly different position, highlighting 
the purported cost savings under each Proposition and the ineffectiveness of the cap-
ital punishment process in California, but took the position that “[b]eyond arguments 
of cost savings and critiques of a biased justice system, a civilized society must stand 
against institutionalized brutality and murder.”37 On the other hand, the San Diego 
Union Tribune noted the cost considerations for Proposition 66, but eschewed any of 
the remaining rationales stated in the prior periodicals above—instead taking a 
 
32 See Sec’y of the State of Cal., supra note 15. 
33 See generally S.F. Chron. Editorial Board, Fight Crime, Not Futility: Abolish Death Penalty, S.F. CHRON. 
(Sept. 1, 2016), http://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/editorials/article/Fight-crime-not-futility-Abolish-death-
penalty-9185804.php. 
34 Id. 
35 Sacramento Bee Editorial Board, End the Illusion: Abolish the Death Penalty, SACRAMENTO BEE (Oct. 7, 
2016), http://www.sacbee.com/opinion/editorials/article106795422.html. 
36 Id. (“Nothing in [Proposition 66] forces the Legislature and governor to increase funding to pay for the ad-
ditional appellate costs—estimated by the legislative analyst to be in the tens of millions annually.”). 
37 Examiner Editorial Board, Examiner Endorsements: Statewide Ballot Measures, S.F. EXAMINER, Oct. 23, 
2016, http://www.sfexaminer.com/examiner-endorsements-statewide-ballot-measures/. 
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wholly pragmatic approach to rejection of Proposition 62.38 After rejecting any ethi-
cal reservations with the death penalty, the Editorial Board stated its position that 
“[t]he branches of California’s government have for decades shown they don’t like 
the death penalty and don’t want it to be used. If Proposition 66 were enacted, history 
suggests its fixes would not be executed with good faith.”39 
 There were, however, two outliers among the articles examined for this 
Note. The San Francisco Chronicle discussed the costs associated with the Proposi-
tions as well, but went beyond the broad generalized statements that either of the 
Propositions would be a move toward correcting injustice and bias in the system 
stated by some commentators.40 Instead the Board based its position, in part, on a 
focus on issues pertaining to the actors within the legal system.41 Specifically, as 
previously noted, the Board took note of the reality that Proposition 66 “attempts to 
compel attorneys to take up capital appeals,” which leads to the potential situation 
where “attorneys less steeped in the fine points of capital appeals…will be represent-
ing inmates with their lives on the line”—a situation that does not “suggest a path 
toward greater justice.”42 By alluding to the potential for injustice, the Chronicle 
inched toward the problems discussed in Part III of this Note, but fell short. Addi-
tionally, by focusing on the practicality and economic advantage of Proposition 62 in 
the final statement of the position, it somewhat undermined the initial strength of the 
prior points.43 The other notable outlier was the Los Angeles Times. Although the 
Times did discuss the dysfunction, the lack of “equal justice,” and dedicated a sub-
stantial amount to the discussion of the cost to taxpayers, the Times’ “chief reason to 
abolish the death penalty in California is that it is cruel and unusual punishment, both 
immoral and inhumane and out of step with the ‘evolving standards of decency’ in 
the United States.”44 This discussion of morality was noticeably absent in the other 
newspaper articles. With that said, there was no further discussion by the Times con-
cerning the underlying basis on which the decision of morality was formed.45 
While the foregoing newspaper statements and the 2016 Information Guide state-
ments in support of Proposition 62 all raise valid points, pointing to a combination of 
fiscal reservations and injustice concerns with the continuation of capital punishment, 
in general, the bulk of the focus and attention appears to be on the former and less on 
the latter. That is, the reasoning and information set forth in support of the repeal 
appears to be monetary in many cases, as does the discussion, and the broader impli-
cation of this media content is that it is reflective, to some extent, of an overall soci-
etal perception of the underlying rationale behind Proposition 62. When questions of 
 
38 See The San Diego Union-Trib. Editorial Board, Why California Should End, Not Streamline, the Death 
Penalty, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Oct. 23, 2016), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/opinion/en-
dorsements/sd-yes-on-prop-62-no-on-prop-66-story.html.  
39 Id. 
40 See S.F. Chron. Editorial Board, supra note 33. 
41 See S.F. Chron. Editorial Board, supra note 33. 
42 See S.F. Chron. Editorial Board, supra note 33. 
43 See S.F. Chron. Editorial Board, supra note 33. (“It’s humane, it’s practical, and it’s fiscally prudent.”). 
44 L.A. Times Editorial Board, Props 62 and 66: California Voters Should End the Death Penalty, Not Speed 
it Up, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-prop-62-prop-66-
20160826-snap-story.html. 
45 See id. 
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morality or inherent bias in the system were raised, there was no real in-depth re-
search into, or emphasis, on the underlying reasoning for the amoral nature of the 
punishment or the real ramifications—discussed in Part III of this Note—of the sys-
tem as it currently is administered. The economic argument is bolstered by well-re-
searched, hard and fast statistics by the Legislative Analyst46 about the savings to 
taxpayers, while the discussions of morality boil down to one word labels, such as 
labeling capital punishment “immoral,” or the inclusion of sound bites like “evolving 
standards of decency” drawn from capital punishment case law with nothing more.47 
This, however, begs the question: on what basis are judgments of morality or immo-
rality formed? The answer to that question was most aptly stated by The Honorable 
Michael R. Merz, a United States Magistrate Judge for the Southern District of Ohio: 
“we learn our morality as we learn everything else—in community—or rather in 
overlapping and competing communities: the family, the neighborhood, the school, 
and the church.”48 
It is, in part, the tenets of the religious denominations discussed below that have 
informed the social conscious since the founding of the United States and, thus, 
should continue to do so. 
 
II. ALTERNATIVE VIEWPOINTS ON THE DEATH PENALTY: THE PERSPECTIVES 
ADVANCED BY CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING AND OTHER RELIGIOUS 
DENOMINATIONS  
While there are many faiths practiced in the United States, and various subdivi-
sions within each denomination, the following discussion is meant to map out the 
main religions practiced in the United States and their respective beliefs regarding 
capital punishment in order to demonstrate the breadth of the potential for conflict 
between personal beliefs and public responsibilities as a professional or  actor within 
the legal system—conflict that can lead to recusal, request for non-assignment, or 
prospective juror removal during voir dire and the resultant problems discussed in 
Part III. To begin, the United States Census Bureau’s calculation of the U.S. popula-
tion in 2010 was just under 309 million citizens.49 As recently as 2015, Evangelical 
Protestants composed 25.4% of the population, Mainline Protestants registered 
14.7%, Non-Christian faiths registered 5.9%, Catholics registered 20.8%, and those 
with no affiliation registered 22.8%.50 Arguably, one of the most outspoken critics of 
capital punishment in the United States requiring exposition is the Roman Catholic 
faith, and thus is the logical place to begin the discussion.  
 
46 Sec’y of the State of Cal., supra note 15, at 78, 81. 
47 See The L.A. Times Editorial Board, supra note 44. 
48 Michael R. Merz, Conscience of a Catholic Judge, 29 U. DAYTON L. REV. 305, 310 (2004).   
49 Quick Facts, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/ta-
ble/PST045216/00. 
50 America’s Changing Religious Landscape, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (2015), http://www.pewfo-
rum.org/2015/05/12/americas-changing-religious-landscape/. 
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A. Catholic Social Teaching 
 As Archbishop Gomez alluded to in his statement in Part I of this Note, the 
Catholic Church’s stance has undergone an important evolution in the last couple 
decades as compared to the early views of the Catholic Church. Dating back to 1980, 
the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) voiced unified opposi-
tion to the continued imposition of capital punishment in the United States and its 
“intent has been…to limit, restrain or end the use of society's ultimate punishment” 
over the course of the last three decades.51 Moreover, the USCCB was not merely 
paying lip service to these ideals, as in 1999, it “made an appeal to abolish the death 
penalty . . . followed in 2000 by . . . ‘Responsibility, Rehabilitation and Restoration: 
A Catholic Perspective on Crime and Criminal Justice’ . . . [and] in 2005 the bishops 
began a national Campaign to End the Use of the Death Penalty…to educate Catho-
lics and non-Catholics and to inform state and congressional legislators as well as the 
courts about the church's teaching.”52 This pivot in position by the USCCB has been 
mirrored elsewhere in the Catholic Church’s new Catechism, most notably in St. John 
Paul II’s encyclical, Evangelium Vitae—though St. John Paul II’s position is slightly 
more nuanced.53  
St. John Paul II’s encyclical has garnered much more attention and commentary 
by the legal community, and rightly so, given St. John Paul II’s position as Pope and 
leader of the Catholic Church when the document was written. In it, St. John Paul II 
elaborates on the Church’s current view of the death penalty through his assertion 
that: 
 
punishment . . . ought not go to the extreme of executing the offender 
except in cases of absolute necessity . . . ‘[i]f bloodless means are suffi-
cient to defend human lives against an aggressor and to protect public 
order and the safety of persons, public authority must limit itself to such 
means, because they better correspond to the concrete conditions of the 
common good and are more in conformity to the dignity of the human 
person.54 
 
Of critical importance in St. John Paul’s exposition—as it pertains to Part III of 
this Note—is that the “necessity” described above only occurs “when it would not be 
possible otherwise to defend society,” a condition that he notes is essentially non-
existent given the improvements in the modern penal system.55 In drawing on St. 
John Paul’s statements above, the logical inference is that, in the Catholic Church, it 
is imperative that the United States use “bloodless means” to protect society, given 
the advances in modern incarceration facilities and techniques, and commentators 
have come to similar conclusions.56  
 
51 Wilton D. Gregory, The Church’s Evolving View on the Death Penalty, CATHOLIC CULTURE (2008), 
https://www.catholicculture.org/culture/library/view.cfm?recnum=8506. 
52 Id. 
53 See St. John Paul II, EVANGELIUM VITAE (1995). 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 John H. Garvey & Amy V. Coney, Catholic Judges in Capital Cases, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 303, 309 (1998). 
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Before continuing, it is important to note—as commentators discussed in Part III 
have pointed out—that St. John Paul’s statements above were not said ex cathedra, 
and therefore, there is debate about what binding force they have on Catholics. How-
ever, given the direction of the Catholic position—the Catholic Church’s continued 
emphasis on issues concerning respect for life—it appears that the day may not be 
too far off where a Pope makes an ex cathedra statement on the death penalty, further 
magnifying the issues discussed below for Catholics. 
B. Other Religious Denominations 
This sentiment held by the Catholic Church aligns with many other religious de-
nominations that have a significant amount of followers in the United States. First, 
the United Methodist Church has come out strongly against the death penalty. Spe-
cifically, the Methodist Church’s rationale for opposition to capital punishment, sim-
ilar to the Catholic Church, puts great weight on the “possibility of reconciliation 
with Christ …through repentance. [Noting] [t]his gift of reconciliation is offered to 
all individuals without exception and gives all life new dignity and sacredness. For 
this reason, we . . . urge [the] elimination [of the death penalty] from all criminal 
codes.”57 Moreover, the United Methodist Church “urge[s] the creation of a . . . new 
system for the care and restoration of . . . offenders . . . [i]n contrast . . . [to retributive 
justice].”58 Additionally, a number of Jewish denominations have spoken out in op-
position to the death penalty—“Conservative, Reform, and Reconstructionist move-
ments in the United States, [and] [o]rthodox Jewish leaders called for a morato-
rium . . .”59—for reasons related to those of the United Methodist Church. For 
example, the Union of Reform Judaism opposes capital punishment because they 
"believe that there is no crime for which the taking of human life by society is justi-
fied, [and] . . . appeal to [their] congregants and to our co-religionists and to all who 
cherish God's mercy and love to join in efforts to eliminate this practice [of capital 
punishment] which lies as a stain upon civilization and our religious conscience.”60 
 While a comprehensive list could be compiled with similar or related reasons 
that a number of churches oppose the death penalty, for the sake of brevity the fol-
lowing are the positions of a handful of other notable denominations that have come 
out against the death penalty: the Episcopal Church, the American Baptist Church, 
the Presbyterian Church, and the National Council of Churches, “which represents 
35 mainstream Protestant and Orthodox churches.”61 However, with that said, there 
are a significant number of Protestant churches that have voiced support for the con-
 
57 Social Principles: The Political Community, THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH (Jan. 24, 2016), 
http://www.umc.org/what-we-believe/political-community#death-penalty. 
58 Id. 
59 Religious Groups’ Official Positions on Capital Punishment, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (2009), 
http://www.pewforum.org/2009/11/04/religious-groups-official-positions-on-capital-punishment/. 
60 Position of the Reform Movement on the Death Penalty, RELIGIOUS ACTION CENTER OF REFORM JUDAISM, 
http://www.rac.org/position-reform-movement-death-penalty?id=1665&pge_prg_id=8089&pge_id=2396. 
61 See PEW RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 59. 
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tinuance of the death penalty, including National Association of Evangelicals, Lu-
theran Church-Missouri Synod, and most notably, the Southern Baptist Church, 
which accounts for over 5% of the practicing citizenry in the United States.62 
 Though there is clearly some dispersion in the positions held in denomina-
tions across the United States and some important religious groups on each side of 
the debate, the message is clear: a large body of faiths in the United States, most 
notably the Catholic Church with over eighty million members, opposes the death 
penalty. The repercussions of these views on the legal system—discussed in Part 
III—is of even greater importance, given the significant amount of judges, lawyers 
and prosecutors in the United States who belong to one of the aforementioned faith 
traditions. 
III. DEATH PANELS, JUDGE RECUSALS, AND PROSECUTOR REQUESTS FOR NON-
ASSIGNMENT 
The impetus for Proposition 62—saving taxpayer money, and removing risk of 
executing innocents63—and Proposition 66—speeding up death penalty proceedings 
to enhance efficiency and save money64—were laudable attempts at reform in pursuit 
of worthwhile goals. As the history of capital sentencing in California, the Proposi-
tion rationales, and the media publications in Part I illustrate, the system is broken 
and the citizenry is correct in discussing the need for a change. The problem, how-
ever, is that the discussion and rationales advanced in Part I are missing the full scope 
of the issue. They are overlooking the larger issue of the bias introduced into capital 
proceedings caused by voluntary or involuntary removal of religious professionals 
and actors in the legal system, the need to give due consideration to religious views, 
and the resultant consequences of ignoring their impact. As a result, the Propositions 
were short sighted, misguided, and inadequate remedies for California’s failing cap-
ital punishment administration. Had Proposition 62 passed, it would not be unreason-
able to envision a time in the future where, given adequate death penalty reform pro-
posals, it becomes cheaper to execute inmates that would have otherwise been 
eligible for the death penalty than to continue incarcerating them for life without pa-
role; thus, undermining one of Proposition 62’s chief arguments for repeal and lead-
ing to a situation where capital punishment could be reinstated. The passage of Prop-
osition 66 was misguided because it failed to properly address the potential problems 
in the administration of the death penalty discussed in the subsections that follow. In 
both of these 2016 Propositions, California’s crucial flaw in the system went un-
addressed—a flaw that merits further in-depth consideration but has only received 
little, if any, serious discussion. This flaw—the unaddressed potential for systematic 
bias against criminal defendants throughout the capital punishment trial process that 
undermines its legitimacy as a permissible course of action for sentencing—arises 
from pro-death penalty judges, bloodthirsty prosecutors, and death qualified juries. 
This Note will address each in turn. 
 
62
 Religious Landscape Study, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/. 
63 See Sec’y of the State of Cal., supra note 15, at 83. 
64 See Sec’y of the State of Cal., supra note 15, at 108. 
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A. Judge Recusal 
Given the potential moral reservations that judges, particularly Catholic judges, 
with strong religious beliefs might have with fulfilling their judicial duties in a capital 
punishment case as a result of their faith, it should come as no surprise that there is 
an abundance of commentary from legal scholars and attorneys on the matter. As one 
scholarly collaboration notes, “[Catholic judges] are obliged by oath, professional 
commitment, and the demands of citizenship to enforce the death penalty. They are 
also obliged to adhere to their church’s teaching on moral matters.”65 This inherent 
complexity of the role of a judge, combined with the position espoused by Pope John 
Paul II’s recent encyclical66 and the USCCB,67 however, has sparked some disagree-
ment among commentators about the implications of this position as it pertains to a 
Catholic judge’s participation in capital cases.  
A review of the commentary surrounding the issue reveals two very different 
approaches to answering the question of whether or not Catholic judges must recuse 
themselves from capital cases in light of the aforementioned recent statements of the 
clergy. The first of these approaches, taken by John Garvey and Amy Coney,68 among 
others,69 attempts to parse out the intricacies of the concept of cooperation with evil 
from Catholic Moral Theology.70 Through an elaborate discussion71 of formal coop-
eration with evil72 versus material cooperation with evil,73 Garvey and Coney came 
to the conclusion that “Catholic Judges (if they are faithful to the teaching of their 
church) are morally precluded from enforcing the death penalty. This means that they 
can neither themselves sentence criminals to death nor enforce jury recommendations 
of death.”74 In order to arrive at this conclusion, Garvey and Coney undertook an 
analysis of the different stages of capital cases (sentencing with a jury, sentencing by 
the judge, among others).75 This analysis, when applied to California’s death penalty 
 
65 Garvey & Coney, supra note 56, at 303. 
66 See St. John Paul II, supra note 53. 
67 See Gregory, supra note 51. 
68 See generally Garvey & Coney, supra note 56. 
69 See generally Edward A. Hartnett, Catholic Judges and Cooperation in Sin, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L. J. 221 
(2006). 
70 See Garvey & Coney, supra note 56, at 309-21. 
71 See Garvey & Coney, supra note 56, at 309-21. 
72 See Garvey & Coney, supra note 56, at 318 (“A person formally cooperates with another person’s immoral 
act when he shares the immoral intention of the other...Formal cooperation is always immoral.”). 
73 See Garvey & Coney, supra note 56, at 318-19 (“Material cooperation involves an act that has the effect of 
helping a wrongdoer, where the cooperator does not share the wrongdoer’s immoral intention…Material co-
operation is only sometimes immoral. We judge this by a kind of moral balancing test—weighing the im-
portance of doing the act against the gravity of the evil, its proximity, the certainty that one’s act will contrib-
ute to it, and the danger of scandal to others.”). 
74 See Garvey & Coney, supra note 56, at 305.  
75 See Garvey & Coney, supra note 56, at 310-11 (“Let us begin by considering the action of the judge who 
sentences a defendant to death upon the jury’s recommendation…This is a straightforward case of formal co-
operation, one in which the judge sets the wheels of injustice in motion. Once the judge enters the order, the 
government is authorized—indeed unless there is a pardon, bound—to put the defendant to death. And the 
judge intends that this should happen.”); see Garvey & Coney, supra note 56, at 311 (“Under the drug kingpin 
law a defendant can opt, with the government’s agreement, to dispense with a jury and have his sentence de-
termined by the judge alone. A judge who imposes the death penalty in such case is plainly engaged in formal 
cooperation…He bears responsibility for the entire decision, and could make it either way.”). 
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procedure (which gives the judge discretion in final sentencing),76 would lead to a 
similar situation in which recusal was the appropriate avenue for a practicing Catholic 
judge under Garvey and Coney’s view. 
The other common approach taken by commentators on this issue omits any dis-
cussion of Catholic Moral Theology. Rather, the beliefs are based on one of three 
common interpretations of the Catholic stance on capital punishment: a literal inter-
pretation of Papal authority in specific instances espoused by Justice Scalia77 and 
others;78 an apparent acceptance of Pope John Paul II’s encyclical based on a plain 
reading;79 or, in some cases, a logical perspective based on personal legal experience 
and bolstered by the Church’s teaching.80 This Note will discuss each interpretation 
in turn. First, Justice Scalia “noted . . . that Evangelium Vitae did not represent ex 
cathedra teaching.”81 Justice Scalia:  
 
argue[d] that since the Church has long allowed the use of the death penalty as a tool of retri-
bution, this ‘tradition’ cannot be swept away by ‘a couple of paragraphs in an encyclical’ or 
by ‘a latest, hot-off-the-presses version of the catechism.’ [Rather,] [r]elying on ‘canonical 
experts,’ Justice Scalia postulate[d] that although Evangelium Vitae must receive ‘thought-
ful . . . consideration,’ it may be rejected by the individual Catholic.82 
 
Though Justice Scalia’s statements clearly indicate that he is not personally of 
the opinion that Church teaching in this area is binding on Catholics, he did further 
note that “[t]he choice for the judge who believes the death penalty to be immoral is 
resignation, rather than simply ignoring duly enacted . . . laws.”83  
The second interpretation is exemplified in the statements of Kevin Doyle. 
Though Doyle acknowledged that the Church’s teaching in the area is not binding,84 
he asserted that “a good-faith reading of what the Church teaching is—the only good-
faith reading—is that currently we have reached the point where if we are able to 
 
76 Cal. Penal Code § 190.3 (West 2006) (“If the defendant has been found guilty of murder in the first degree, 
and a special circumstance has been charged and found to be true, or if the defendant may be subject to the 
death penalty after having been found guilty of violating subdivision (a) of Section 1672 of the Military and 
Veterans Code or Sections 37, 128, 219, or 4500 of this code, the trier of fact shall determine whether the pen-
alty shall be death or confinement in state prison for a term of life without the possibility of parole.”). 
77 See Art C. Cody, Introduction: The King’s Good Servants: Catholics as Participants in Capital Litigation, 
44 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 283, 287 (2005). 
78 Doyle & Hynes, supra note 5, at 303 (“It has certainly never spoken ex cathedra on the issue. So it has not 
influenced my position on supporting the death penalty where I have to.”). 
79 Doyle & Hynes, supra note 5, at 342 (“[A] good-faith reading of what the Church teaching is—the only 
good-faith reading—is that currently we have reached the point where if we are able to incapacitate someone, 
then it is not morally right to execute them; that is not permissible.”). 
80 Gerald F. Uelmen, Catholic Jurors and the Death Penalty, 44 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 355, 376 (2005) (“I 
started out in my legal career . . . as a prosecutor . . . . Fifteen years later, I concluded that the death penalty is 
unethical, immoral, and unacceptable under any circumstances. I would not be a ‘death qualified’ juror, and if 
I were a judge, I would have to recuse myself in a death penalty case. I reached that conclusion not because of 
anything that the Pope or any bishop had to say about it, although giving respectful consideration to those 
views has certainly reinforced my own.”). 
81 Merz, supra note 48, at 317. 
82 Cody, supra note 77, at 287 (citing Antonin Scalia, God’s Justice and Ours, FIRST THINGS 17, 20-21 
(2002). 
83 Cody, supra note 77, at 292 (citing Antonin Scalia, God’s Justice and Ours, FIRST THINGS 17, 20-21 
(2002). 
84 Doyle, & Hynes, supra note 5, at 328.  
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incapacitate someone, then it is not morally right to execute them; that is not permis-
sible.”85 Lastly, the final interpretation, held by Judge Michael Merz, focused on the 
fact that, in his view of Evangelium Vitae, mandatory rejection of capital punishment 
is not required of Catholics.86 However, his “own conclusion as a citizen . . . after 
much thought and nearly a decade of experience is that Evangelium Vitae is right as 
a matter of policy,”87 and that his views “as a Catholic American citizen [are] partly 
informed by current papal teaching.”88 With that said, Judge Merz did state that “the 
prudential judgment about whether capital punishment remains necessary to defend 
innocent life is one about which reasonable, moral people can differ, whether we shall 
have it or not should be left to the mechanisms of democracy . . . [A] Catholic can 
still be a conscientious judge and participate in capital cases.”89  
As the foregoing demonstrates, it is unclear whether or not the faith of a Catholic 
judge would cause them to recuse themselves from capital cases. Additionally, given 
the lack of commentary on the issue as it pertains to the other faiths discussed in Part 
II of this Note, the role that faith plays in the decision of whether or not recusal is the 
appropriate measure for judges of other faiths is also unclear. That said, given the 
strength of the positions these faiths hold in opposition to capital punishment, it is 
not unreasonable to infer that consideration of one’s faith might also require at least 
some devout judges from these respective faiths to recuse themselves. What is clear, 
however, are the implications that recusal might have on the administration of capital 
punishment in California. In the event of recusal, a judge may be replaced by a pro-
death penalty judge who is willing to hear the case. For example, it has been argued 
that a pro-death penalty judge may take the case because he does not want to appear 
“soft on crime,” and that the judge may hold this position on capital punishment, in 
part, to win favor with the electorate for upcoming elections,90 similar to the discus-
sion of prosecutors in Part III, subsection B. This sentiment was echoed by Justice 
John Paul Stevens in his dissent in Harris v. Alabama: 
 
[t]he ‘higher authority’ to whom present-day capital judges may be ‘too 
responsive’ is a political climate in which judges who covet higher of-
fice—or who merely wish to remain judges—must constantly profess 
their fealty to the death penalty . . . The danger that they will bend to 
political pressures when pronouncing sentence in highly publicized cap-
ital cases is the same danger confronted by judges beholden to King 
 
85 Doyle, & Hynes, supra note 5, at 342. 
86 See Merz, supra note 48, at 311 (“If capital punishment is not wrong absolutely, in every instance, then 
there is room for statesmen, acting in good conscience, to disagree with the Pope’s prudential judgment that it 
is not necessary in modern industrial societies. This is not to say . . .Pope John Paul’s conclusions are wrong, 
just that they are not mandatory.”). 
87 See Merz, supra note 48, at 311-13 (“First of all, Pope John Paul’s reasons are good ones. The traditional 
justification of capital punishment—that it is necessary to redress the injustice of the murder of the innocent—
is not working in our society . . . . If we were to teach ourselves that every human has an unalienable absolute 
right to life . . . [m]ight that not ward off the potential for extending the culture of death to euthanizing our 
dependent elderly? But I have reasons in addition to the Pope’s. The death penalty seriously skews allocation 
of criminal justice resources . . . . If capital punishment worked to reduce innocent deaths, it might be worth 
the costs. But innocent life seems no more respected now than it did when executions were far fewer in the 
1960’s and 1970’s.”). 
88 See Merz, supra note 48, at 313. 
89 See Merz, supra note 48, at 318. 
90 See Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of 
Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. Rev. 759, 760-61 (1995).   
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George III.91 
 
Justice Steven’s remarks are particularly relevant due to the manner in which 
California’s judiciary is selected: “[a]ccording to California’s constitution, judges of 
the supreme court and courts of appeal are nominated by the governor . . . Appellate 
judges must stand for retention in the next gubernatorial election after their appoint-
ment . . . Superior court judges are chosen in nonpartisan elections for six-year 
terms.”92 The implication of this system of judicial selection, as Justice Stevens high-
lights, is that judges may not be as immune to political pressures as one might hope, 
as they seek to retain their position on the bench or advance their career. As one 
commentator points out, “[t]his raises serious questions about the independence and 
integrity of the judiciary and the ability of judges to enforce the Bill of Rights and 
otherwise be fair and impartial in capital cases.”93 While it could be argued that the 
current election climate may not be as hostile toward judges who do not strongly 
support capital punishment as it once was, the fact still remains that, while support 
for the death penalty has fallen in recent years, a majority of the Americans who 
express their opinion on the issue still favor it,94 and Californians are no exception.95   
Regardless of a pro-death penalty judge’s reasoning for hearing a case, the pro-
death penalty stance of a judge may introduce conscious or unconscious bias into 
death penalty proceedings in California due to the discretion afforded to judges in the 
process. Further, this bias in proceedings may occur more frequently than it otherwise 
might due to the pro-death penalty judge replacing the prior judge in continued in-
stances of recusal. While there are many factors that may bias legal proceedings 
against a defendant, the replacement of a religiously devout judge who has recused 
himself with a pro-death penalty judge has the potential to lead to the injustice and 
conviction of the innocent that Propositions 62 and 66 were trying to remove. Alt-
hough the case for obligatory recusal of Catholic judges or judges of other faiths is 
not settled, the fact still remains that, as the aforementioned legal practitioners’ be-
liefs demonstrate, some judges would—or will, in fact—recuse themselves, opening 
the bench up for a pro-death penalty judge and leading to potential pro-death bias in 
some capital cases. Though the scope of the problem is unclear, the seriousness of 
the potential resultant consequences—bias in a trial that leads to conviction and a 
sentence to death row—when one or more judges recuse themselves from hearing 
capital cases necessitates inclusion of faith in the discussion of the rationale for 
whether or not to retain the death penalty. Otherwise, one is left asking the same 
question that Judge Merz asked: “[w]hat sort of public officials shall we have if we 
exclude all those who leave their morality, their consciences, at the door to their new 
federal offices?”96 
 
91 Id. at 760 (citing 513 U.S. 504, 518 (1995) (Stevens, J. dissenting)). 
92 Judicial Selection in the States: California, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, http://www.judicialse-
lection.us/judicial_selection/index.cfm?state=CA. 
93 Bright & Keenan, supra note 90, at 760. 
94 Baxter Oliphant, Support for Death Penalty Lowest in More than Four Decades, PEW RESEARCH CENTER. 
(Sept. 29, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/29/support-for-death-penalty-lowest-in 
more-than-four- decades/. 
95 POLITICO, supra note 30. 
96 Merz, supra note 48, at 315. 
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B. Prosecutorial Requests for Non-Assignment 
Much of the same analysis that applies to judges applies to prosecutors; however, 
it is arguably more important in the case of prosecutors, given the discretion that 
prosecutors have to seek the death penalty and the role that they play within a trial. 
Similar to the discussion on judges, there appears to be a conflict of views regarding 
the weight (either binding or informative) that the Catholic Church’s position should 
have in the professional lives of prosecutors. While Garvey and Coney do not exam-
ine prosecutors in their discussion of cooperation with evil, it is fair to infer from 
their position that a practicing Catholic prosecutor could not participate in a capital 
case, as he or she would be formally cooperating with evil.97  
On the other hand, there are prosecutors who, in relying solely on the hierarchy 
of statements by church authorities, have come to vastly different conclusions in their 
beliefs on whether or not the Catholic Church’s stance on the death penalty precludes 
them from prosecuting a capital case. For example, Charles Hynes, a former Kings 
County District Attorney, held the position that he was “not at all influenced by the 
Church’s position. I’m not sure that it is as clear as it ought to be. It has certainly 
never spoken ex cathedra on the issue. So it has not influenced my position on sup-
porting the death penalty where I have to.”98 In referencing the fact that the Church’s 
teaching does not represent an ex cathedra statement, Hynes adopts a model similar 
to Justice Scalia.99 However, Hynes does further note that “[f]or [him] it would be 
very simple if the Pope said tomorrow, ex cathedra, ‘capital punishment is wrong; 
it’s immoral.’ Then I have no problem. I recuse myself as a Catholic. I think that 
might lead to Pataki removing me, as he did Johnson . . . .”100  
Here, again, the frequency with which a Catholic prosecutor (or a prosecutor of 
another faith) might find that the strong positions their faith maintains precludes them 
from prosecuting a capital case, and thus be compelled to request non-assignment on 
all capital cases, remains unclear. But, similar to the discussion concerning judges, it 
is clear that some prosecutors might find it necessary to request non-assignment. The 
problem with this, as Doyle points out, is that “when you recuse yourself, if you 
recuse yourself because you're not bloodthirsty enough, the guy or the gal that they 
are going to put in after you is going to be plenty bloodthirsty.” 101 If a prosecutor 
recuses themselves for religious reasons, this scenario has the potential to lead to a 
whole host of other problems, given the power a prosecutor has in capital cases and 
the potential for the injustice that Proposition 62 and 66 were attempting to fix.  
To understand the problems that may arise from prosecutor recusal, it is neces-
sary to understand the nature of the prosecutor’s influence in charging defendants. 
As noted by E. Michael McCann, a Milwaukee County District Attorney, this power 
allows a prosecutor to exercise great influence over the direction of a potential capital 
 
97 See Garvey & Coney, supra note 56, at 318 (“A person formally cooperates with another person’s immoral 
act when he shares the immoral intention of the other . . . . Formal cooperation is always immoral.”). 
98 Doyle & Hynes, supra note 5, at 303. 
99 See Merz, supra note 48, at 317. 
100 Doyle & Hynes, supra note 5, at 327. 
101 Id. at 340. 
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punishment proceeding and the likelihood that a defendant will be sentenced to 
death.102 More specifically, as Carrie Leonetti asserts: 
 [p]rosecutors have enormous power in determining who is subjected to 
criminal punishment because they have broad discretion in deciding whom to charge. 
Through their charging decisions, choices among case-ending options (including dis-
missal and plea offers), and sentencing recommendations, they often become adjudi-
cators of guilt and punishment, with courts simply confirming their underlying deci-
sions. Absent a showing of invidious discrimination based on race or religion, for 
instance, courts will not question a prosecution’s decision of whom and how to 
charge in a given case  
 
. . . The only legal checks on prosecutorial discretion are the burden of 
proof and the procedural requirements that prosecutors meet during the 
pretrial process. In most cases, prosecutors may ‘charge at will.’103 
 
This influence, as Leonetti points out, has the potential to lead to prosecutorial 
overreaching104 or misconduct, in part because a prosecutor’s win-loss record influ-
ences future possibilities for career advancement based on “career-advancement 
structures in prosecutors’ offices,” which can lead to a –win-at-all-costs attitude.105 
 Unfortunately, this potential for misconduct is not merely theoretical; it has 
played out repeatedly across the country, as found in a recent study by Harvard’s Fair 
Punishment Project.106 In the study of the top five deadliest prosecutors, the research-
ers noted the problems with “personality-driven prosecutors” and cited staggering 
statistics on the role that this handful of prosecutors has played in placing defendants 
on death row.107 Of note, the prosecutor ranked first on the list obtained thirty-eight 
death sentences, with misconduct found in 36.8% of his cases;108 the second on the 
list obtained fifty-four death sentences, with a misconduct rate of 33.3%;109 and the 
third obtained thirty-nine sentences, with a misconduct rate of 65.1%.110 In addition, 
the study demonstrated the win-at-all-costs attitude Leonetti raised in her commen-
tary.111 
 
102 E. Michael McCann, Opposing Capital Punishment: A Prosecutor’s Perspective, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 649, 
649 (1996) (“In 1940, then United States Attorney General Robert H. Jackson stated, ‘the prosecutor has more 
control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other person in America.’ ‘It’s local prosecutors, not judges 
or governors, who most often decide which criminals live or die for their crimes,’ Tina Rosenberg flatly pos-
tulated in her New York Times magazine article entitled Deadliest D.A. Both statements are entirely accu-
rate.”). 
103 Carrie Leonetti, When the Emperor has No Clothes III: Personnel Policies and Conflicts of Interest in 
Prosecutors’ Offices, 22 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 53, 54-55 (2012). 
104 Id. at 54. 
105 See id. at 81-82 (“Prosecutors’ career incentives do not encourage them to carefully assess which defend-
ants are most deserving of punishment. For them, punishment is not merely a matter of justice, but an adver-
sarial tool to be used to increase conviction rates . . . . Threats of harsh sentences are not only allowed, they 
are expected.”). 
106 America’s Top Five Deadliest Prosecutors: How Overzealous Personalities Drive the Death Penalty, FAIR 
PUNISHMENT PROJECT (2016), http://fairpunishment.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/FPP-Top5Report_FI-
NAL.pdf. 
107 Id. at 3. 
108 Id. at 5. 
109 Id. at 8. 
110 Id. at 11. 
111 Leonetti, supra note 103, at 77. 
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The foregoing commentary and study lead to the logical inference that, whether 
recusal for religious beliefs leads to replacement of the recused prosecutor with a 
younger, inexperienced prosecutor,112 or a bloodthirsty prosecutor with a win-at-all-
costs mentality, or both, the practical implication of recusal is that it has the potential 
to create a significant bias against a defendant, which carries with it important impli-
cations for the opportunity to receive a fair trial and the possibility of being sentenced 
to death row. With the passage of Proposition 66, the potential for the problems dis-
cussed above still exists in the system, and yet the issue has received no airtime in 
the commentary on remedying the injustice currently present in the system. It is for 
this reason that any discussion of the inherent injustice that must be fixed in the cap-
ital punishment system as it is currently administered in California must include a 
discussion of the role that faith considerations, or lack thereof, actually play as a 
contributing factor in the injustice that Proposition 62 and 66 were seeking to fix. To 
do otherwise leads to a perpetuation of the problematic system that undermines the 
credibility of the penal system at the highest levels. 
C. Death Panel Formation: Death Qualified Juries and Peremptory 
Challenges  
 The final aspect of capital punishment trial proceedings that merits further 
exposition is the process of death qualification and peremptory challenges. At the 
outset of a trial, the court oversees the voir dire process of selecting jurors who are 
able to participate in the proceeding in a fair and unbiased manner.113 However, 
“unique to the trial of a capital offense is the voir dire process of ‘death qualification,’ 
in which prospective jurors who are unalterably opposed to the death penalty are 
eliminated from the jury panel.”114 It is at this stage at which any strongly held reli-
gious beliefs in opposition of the death penalty may serve to disqualify potential ju-
rors from the jury pool. It is also at this stage where the intended unbiased jury pool 
of one’s peers begins to become less unbiased. This has been confirmed by many 
commentators, most notably a former prosecutor, Gerald Uelmen, with intimate un-
derstanding of the death qualification process who asserted that “[j]urors whose reli-
gious views disfavor death are less likely to make it through the selection process 
than jurors whose religious views encourage its use.”115 This is particularly problem-
atic, given that fact that “[r]esearch studies further suggest that death-qualified juries 
are more conviction-prone than juries whose membership has not been affected by 
the death qualification process.”116 
 In order to understand why this is the case, it is necessary to provide an over-
view of voir dire standards and the operation of the process in capital cases. At the 
 
112 McCann, supra note 102, at 662 (“The young, inexperienced prosecutor, not having confronted erroneous 
or biased or perjurious witnesses, is more likely to accept their credibility than the more seasoned, veteran dis-
trict attorney who has encountered many such persons over years of practice.”). 
113  Michael W. Peters, Constitutional Law: Does ‘Death Qualification’ Spell Death for the Capital Defend-
ant's Constitutional Right to an Impartial Jury? [Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986)], 26 WASH-
BURN L. J. 382 (1987). 
114 Id. 
115 Uelmen, supra note 80, at 362. 
116 James R. Acker, When the Cheering Stopped: An Overview and Analysis of New York’s Death Penalty 
Legislation, 17 PACE L. REV. 41, 154 (1996).  
  
282 Journal of Legislation [Vol. 43:2] 
outset of the process for impaneling a capital jury, prospective jurors often are re-
quired to complete a questionnaire where they “will ordinarily be asked if they hold 
any religious views that might affect their decision whether to impose a sentence of 
death…[t]he lawyers, and often the judge, will then follow up with additional voir 
dire questions,” to  determine which jurors to impanel, “and the religious affiliation 
of the juror will emerge.”117 There are two methods—relevant to this Note—through 
which a prospective juror might be excused for duty. The first of these is a for-cause 
removal.118 The standards for a for-cause removal of a prospective juror were estab-
lished in Witherspoon v. Illinois and Wainwright v. Witt.119 In Witherspoon, the Court 
“held that a ‘sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or rec-
ommended it was chosen by excluding [potential jurors] for cause simply because 
they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or re-
ligious scruples against its infliction.”120 However, “the Court also implied that jurors 
who avowed that they would refuse to impose death in any circumstance could con-
stitutionally be excluded for cause without violating the rights of the defendant.”121 
The Witherspoon standard was subsequently altered by the Supreme Court in Wain-
right, where the Court “ruled that a juror may be excluded for cause in a death penalty 
case if the juror’s views would ‘prevent or substantially impair’ the performance of 
his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.”122 This new 
standard “broadened the range of people who could be excluded by death qualifica-
tion.”123 
 The other method through which a prospective juror might be excluded from 
a jury is by peremptory challenge,124 where an “attorney may act on belief, bias or 
prejudice or to eliminate the perceived bias or prejudice of the potential juror.”125 
However, the number of peremptory challenges is limited.126 With that said, there is 
one key difference between for-cause removals and peremptory challenges; for a per-
emptory challenge, “[t]he attorney does not state a reason for the challenge and the 
judge does not decide if the challenge is appropriate, unless the other attorney alleges 
that the challenge was made for an impermissible reason.”127 In the context of a reli-
gious-based peremptory challenge in a death penalty case, one impermissible reason 
 
117 Uelmen, supra note 80, at 358-59. 
118 Brian Galle, Free Exercise Rights of Capital Jurors, 101 COLUM. L. 
REV. 569, 569-70 (2001). 
119  Id.  
120 Uelmen, supra note 80, at 356 (citing Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 (1968)). 
121 Galle, supra note 118, at 570; see also Uelmen, supra note 80, at 360 (“In a footnote, the Court added that 
prospective jurors could be excluded if they made it unmistakably clear that they would automatically vote 
against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the 
trial of the case before them. Many courts subsequently adopted the standard expressed in the footnote …”). 
122 Uelmen, supra note 80, at 360-61 (citing Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985)). 
123 Death Qualification, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN CONTEXT, http://www.capitalpunishmentincontext.org/re-
sources/deathqualification. 
124 Galle, supra note 118, at 569. 
125 73 Am. Jur. 3d Proof of Facts § 89 (2003).  
126 Id.   
127 Id. (“Challenges for cause must be for a specific reason which persuades a judge that the juror cannot be 
impartial. Peremptory challenges can be based on the attorney’s guess, hunches, prejudices, or on no reason at 
all”). 
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may be religious affiliation.128 However, there is case law that supports the idea that 
“challenges on the basis of [jurors’] beliefs” are not permissible.129 The reason being 
that “[i]f the person’s religious beliefs affect his or her ability to judge the facts of 
the case and apply the law fairly and if it is shown that the juror has expressed those 
beliefs (as opposed to the attorney attributing the beliefs to the juror), that is a legiti-
mate basis for peremptory challenge.”130  
 Similar to the discussion on judges and prosecutors, the implications of the 
standards governing the usage of for-cause removals and peremptory challenges on 
Catholics and other religious persons is unclear. As the foregoing sections of this 
Note on judges and prosecutors demonstrated,131 there is no clear interpretation of 
what the Catholic Church’s teaching means as it relates to their role in the legal sys-
tem, and the same analysis applies to jurors. It has been argued Catholics are not 
“obligated to hold the view espoused in the Catechism of the Catholic Church be-
cause it does not represent ex cathedra teaching,” which would mean that a Catholic 
juror might survive voir dire questioning.132 However, a Catholic juror who accepts 
the Church’s position on the death penalty and expresses those views would likely be 
excluded from a capital case.133 The reality is that it is likely that at least some Cath-
olics and members of other faiths will express views that will cause them to be re-
moved from capital cases, a situation that has already occurred in prior cases.134 The 
removal of Catholic jurors and members of other faiths who are faithful to their re-
spective church’s teaching can have a profound influence on the adjudication of 
cases. It has been noted that “[d]eath-qualified juries tend to deliberate for less time, 
discuss the evidence presented less extensively, and are more apt to convict defend-
ants and find them guilty of more serious charges than are juries that have not been 
death-qualified.”135 Thus, the injustices and biases that Proposition 62 and 66 sought 
to correct are, in fact, able to persist in our system of capital punishment—in part, as 
a result of the failure to bring religious considerations to bear on the issue. Without 
going beyond a cursory analysis of the problems surrounding capital punishment and 
delving deeper into how the capital punishment system actually operates and its ef-
fects on the fair adjudication of cases, California will continue to engage in a mis-
guided approach that fails to consider the totality of the underlying factors contrib-
uting to injustice in capital cases. It is this reality that requires at least some inclusion 
of religious beliefs in the discussion and a consideration of the effects they have on 
the administration of capital punishment. 
 
 
128 Id. 
129 Id.  
130 Id. 
131 See infra Part III.  
132 Uelmen, supra note 80, at 363. 
133 Uelmen, supra note 80, at 362. 
134 Uelmen, supra note 80, at 368 (discussing Arizona v. Purcell, 18 P.3d 113, 122 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001); 73 
Am. Jur. 3d Proof of Facts, supra note 125, at § 89 (discussing State v. Naranjo, 321 P.3d 398 (Ariz. 2014); 
People v. Bryant, 334 P.3d 573 (Cal. 2014)). 
135 Acker, supra note 116, at 154. 
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IV. CALIFORNIA’S SHORT SIGHTED BALLOT INITIATIVES AND PROPOSED SOLUTION 
 As discussed previously, one of the key factors advanced by the respective 
supporters of both Proposition 62 and Proposition 66 was the financial impact. There 
was no meaningful discussion or research advanced to highlight why injustice, at 
times, permeates the capital punishment trial process. Rather, in reading the discourse 
around the initiatives, it often seemed to boil down to a discussion of dollars and 
cents. Assuming for the sake of argument that Proposition 62 had been passed, it 
would have at least temporarily mitigated the risk that the problems discussed in Part 
III would arise. However, if, in the future, it became cheaper to execute criminals, 
capital punishment could potentially be reinstituted and the risk would return. With 
the passage of Proposition 66, the problems discussed in Part III of this Note are ever 
present, undermining the administration of justice and potentially public trust and 
support. It is for this reason that, among other factors, the short-sighted focus on the 
monetary benefits was misplaced. Instead of delving into the deeper problems with 
the system and bringing to the fore discussions of the impact of various constituencies 
on the process, such as the religious viewpoints of different faiths represented in the 
state, Californians simply left them unaddressed. In order to remedy the potential 
biases introduced in Part III, the following discussion proposes a solution that Cali-
fornia and other states might follow to solve the problem. 
 Given the strongly entrenched pro-death penalty views of the citizenry in 
some states—illustrated by the recent affirmation and staunch support for the death 
penalty in Oklahoma and other states—and the general support among United States 
citizens for the continuation of capital punishment as a viable sentencing option, it is 
clear that there are many obstacles to overcome before remedying the injustices dis-
cussed in Part III. One potential course of action—suggested by former prosecutor 
Uelmen—to set change in motion and address these problems could be best described 
as a wait-and-see approach. Uelmen asserts that,“[a]s the proportion of jurors, judges, 
and prosecutors who refuse to participate in the continued administration of a morally 
bankrupt law continues to grow, more and more states will consider the wisdom of 
continuing this folly and will join with the civilized nations of the world in rejecting 
laws that permit death as a penalty.”136  Although support for capital punishment has 
been waning to some degree in the last decade,137 a more comprehensive approach 
than the one Uelmen advocates is necessary to further the discourse on the death 
penalty.  
In order to bring about a substantive change in the manner in which the death 
penalty is currently discussed, this Note advocates a two-pronged approach. It is, in 
part, modeled off of New Jersey’s recent success in abolishing the death penalty, 
which incorporated input from religious leaders by appointing them as members of 
an investigatory committee.138  
 
136 Uelmen, supra note 80, at 362. 
137 Oliphant, supra note 94. 
138 See generally Robert J. Martin, Killing Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The First State in Modern His-
tory to Repeal its Death Penalty Statute, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 485 (2010). 
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A. Prong 1: New Jersey Approach 
Through the confluence of multiple factors—the advocacy of a grassroots group 
called New Jerseyans for Alternatives to the Death Penalty,139 a lawsuit that chal-
lenged the process of execution and led to a moratorium,140 and a protracted course 
of bipartisan politicking141 —New Jersey passed a bill, which, among other things, 
created a New Jersey Death Penalty Commission.142 The bill stipulated that the com-
position of the Commission was to be set as follows:  
 
The Governor made five appointments, of which at least one had to be 
a representative of the Murder Victims Families for Reconciliation and 
New Jersey Crime Victim’s Center, as well as at least two representa-
tives from the ‘religious/ethical community’ in New Jersey. The Senate 
President and the Speaker of the Assembly both had two appointments 
and, in each case, one of their appointments had to be a Republican and 
one Democrat. The other four appointments consisted of the state Public 
Defender, the state Attorney General and the President of the New Jer-
sey State Bar Association, or their respective designees, and a repre-
sentative of the County Prosecutor’s Association of New Jersey. Alt-
hough unstated, it was understood that the DPSC membership was 
supposed to be unbiased or at least balanced in its views at the outset, in 
other words, not possessing a clear majority of members either favoring 
or opposition abolition of the death penalty.143 
 
Notably, the Commission selected Reverend M. William Howard, Jr., a Baptist 
Pastor, as its Chairman144 and also included a Rabbi on the Commission.145 After 
engaging in five public hearings where the Commission “received testimony from 
more than seventy witnesses, representing many varying points of view [including 
‘bishops, ministers, rabbis, and law professors’]” and further Commission delibera-
tion, the Commission recommended that New Jersey abolish the death penalty,146 
which eventually bolstered legislative efforts to finally do so.147 It is telling that the 
New Jersey legislature thought it important to include these viewpoints. While it is 
unclear the extent to which the religious viewpoints offered by members of the Com-
mission—and other faith leaders at the public hearings—factored into the ultimate 
decision to abolish the death penalty, the fact remains that the religious viewpoints 
were at least considered and brought into the discourse, an approach by which Cali-
fornia and other states might also benefit. 
 
139 See id. at 497-511. 
140 Id. at 495-96. 
141 See id. 
142 Id. at 516. 
143 Id. at 517. 
144 Martin, supra note 141, at 519. 
145 N.J. Death Penalty Study Comm’n, NEW JERSEY DEATH PENALTY STUDY COMMISSION REPORT (2007), 
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/committees/dpsc_final.pdf. 
146 Martin, supra note 141, at 518-519, 522. 
147 Martin, supra note 141, at 522. 
  
286 Journal of Legislation [Vol. 43:2] 
B. Prong 2: Public Service Announcement Campaign 
 The second aspect of the solution to enact a substantive change in the dis-
course surrounding the death penalty is a public service announcement campaign. It 
has been noted that Justice Marshall “maintained that despite the thirty-five death 
penalty statutes then in existence, a ‘fully informed’ citizenry would reject capital 
punishment.”148 It is my supposition that Justice Marshall was referring specifically 
to the flaws inherent in the death penalty charging and trial process and the lack of 
public awareness on the matter. This dual approach of including  religious perspec-
tives—in the same vein as the New Jersey approach—coupled with an added layer 
of discussion to the debate in the form of a public service announcement campaign 
providing information to the public on which to form their views of the death penalty, 
would address Justice Marshall’s position and meaningfully add to the discussion on 
capital punishment.  
As with many social issues, one’s individual beliefs are generally the culmination 
of a long-term socialization process, beginning from a young age and often strength-
ening in resolve into adulthood. However, oftentimes one’s social issue positions are 
only formed through abstract thought —hypothetical scenarios, such as “what sen-
tence should the perpetrator receive if they murdered someone I love”—and poten-
tially a discussion of the merits, rather than viewpoints formed on the basis of well-
researched, in-depth knowledge and thorough understanding of the subject matter. 
This disconnect between one’s conceptualization of the death penalty and having ac-
tual knowledge of the operation of the death penalty in the judicial system, from the 
initial discretion of the prosecutor in seeking a capital charge through the jury’s ver-
dict and potential for abuse, erects an informational barrier to the average citizen’s 
understanding of the implications of the death penalty and skews the basis on which 
they assert their continued support. It is for this reason that the infusion of religious 
viewpoints into the discussion must also be accompanied by information educating 
the citizenry on the implications of  capital cases, the manner in which they are car-
ried out at each stage, and the associated flaws that have continued to occur with the 
death penalty. 
The three aforementioned issues that arise with capital punishment concerning 
juries, judges, and prosecutors are matters that the average citizen voting on Propo-
sition 62 and 66 most likely has never had any exposure to, and with good reason. 
These issues are discussed in Notes similar to this one, read only by actors in the legal 
system and academics. It is easy to adopt an “out of sight, out of mind” mentality 
when it comes to issues like capital punishment because they do not directly impact 
the average citizen tasked with passing judgment on the merits of initiatives like 
Proposition 62 and 66.  In order to remedy this trend, advocates must engage in a 
more robust informational campaign. With honest, open dialogue and a presentation 
of empirical evidence on the matter, it would become that much harder for those in 
 
148 Kenneth Williams, Should Judges Who Oppose Capital Punishment Resign? A Reply to Justice Scalia, 10 
VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 317, 328 n. 62 (2003) (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 36-63) (Marshall, J., 
concurring) (recognizing that “American citizens know almost nothing about capital punishment,” but main-
taining “that the great mass of citizens would conclude on the basis [of accurate information] that the death 
penalty is immoral and therefore unconstitutional.”)). 
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support of the death penalty to maintain their viewpoint and defend its merits. The 
stranglehold that previously socialized beliefs have over these individuals would nec-
essarily begin to weaken when they are confronted with incontrovertible facts. With 
this consistent exposure and engagement of the material at issue begins the growth 
of changing societal attitudes and pressure on the legislature from voting blocks that 
cannot be ignored—a trend that has been repeated consistently with great success 
regarding other social issues in modern day. 
CONCLUSION 
 Regardless of one’s faith, or lack thereof, there is value in bringing in the 
perspectives of Catholicism and other faiths into the discussion on the death penalty 
as a comparative law model.149  Perhaps the best method of doing so would be Pro-
fessor Sam Levine’s intermediate approach, which would “allow religious arguments 
to be considered and possibly adopted on the basis of their potential relevance and 
logic vis-à-vis American Legal thought.”150 Under this approach, “[certain limita-
tions are placed] on the influence of religious principles in American law, [and] at 
the same time this mode of analysis does not automatically exclude religious argu-
ments that have relevance independent of their religious significance.”151 A model of 
discourse based on this, “likely allows for widespread use of religious ideas in Amer-
ican legal discourse, as religious ideas are acceptable to the extent that they present 
ideas that are helpful in considering questions arising in American legal thought.”152 
While this approach highlights the utility of bringing religion into the judicial sphere, 
Levine also notes a logical perspective for why it should be permissible when he puts 
forth a prior argument by Professor Stephen Carter. Carter noted, “in the context of 
constitutional interpretation, ‘if judges may properly consult views of morality or 
philosophy outside the text, then there is no good reason to restrict them from con-
sidering religious perspectives.’”153  While this idea raises a very valid point, and 
might be a compelling rationale for lawyers and other actors within the legal system 
who are familiar with this practice of judges, at times, drawing on sources outside of 
the text in their reasoning, it might ring hollow to legislators and members of the 
public who are not so well versed in legal opinions and the modes of operation in the 
judiciary. Therefore, if Professor’s Levine’s argument is unacceptable to certain 
members of the public, perhaps there is an alternative approach that better addresses 
 
149 Samuel J. Levine, Capital Punishment and Religious Arguments: An Intermediate Approach, 9 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 179, 184-88 (2000) (“Religion, then, may provide a contrast case to the American legal 
system, offering perspectives that may shed light or perhaps offer useful alternatives in assessing both settled 
and emerging areas of law…An examination of some of the attempts to apply religious principles in [the area 
of capital punishment] suggests that religious thought has much to offer the contemporary debate over capital 
punishment. At the same time, it appears that the value of many religious arguments lies in their appeal to a 
logic that need not rely on the authority of a religious system…to the extent that religion offers insights that, 
at the very least, enrich the level of discussion, ignoring these insights would seem to prove counterproductive 
and unfortunate.”). 
150 Id. at 181. 
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153 Id. at 182 (citing Stephen L. Carter, The Religiously Devout Judge, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 932 (1989)). 
  
288 Journal of Legislation [Vol. 43:2] 
the concerns of those who are still hesitant to allow religious views into judicial dis-
course. But the fact remains, there is value in the inclusion of religious perspectives 
in the discussion surrounding the death penalty, as Part III of this Note demonstrates. 
With that said, the position this Note is advocating is neither an easy task nor one 
that is likely to gain political support, especially given the increasingly fractured na-
ture of political parties and views and the progressively strengthening push to remove 
religion from any political or legislative discussion.  However, the difficulty of the 
task at hand does not detract from the necessity of engaging in the discussion and 
bringing the views of Catholicism and other faiths to bear on the issue. The issues 
raised in Part III of this Note have grave consequences in the capital punishment 
context, and California and other states would be well-advised to consider the rami-
fications of the current system. To do otherwise would be an affront to our criminal 
justice system and a continuing disregard for the pillars upon which our criminal 
justice system was built—the right to a fair, just, unbiased criminal trial. 
 
